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Federalism All the Way Up: State
Standing and “The New Process
Federalism”
Jessica Bulman-Pozen*

I. Federalism up to the Separation of Powers ....................................... 1740
II. State Standing Within Federal Law ................................................. 1745
Heather Gerken’s Jorde Lecture, Federalism 3.0, is characteristically sage
and stimulating. She urges us to accept thoroughgoing state-federal integration
and to recognize the possibilities of state power even when the state is acting as
a “servant” to the federal government. Gerken also argues that we need a “new
process federalism.” Suggesting that we begin with the anti-coercion principle
of NFIB v. Sebelius’s Spending Clause ruling, she calls on us “to rethink our
account of the role judges play in policing state-federal tussles.”1
But what counts as a state-federal tussle? The very administrative and
political integration Gerken embraces means that state-federal tussles will not
necessarily be framed as such. To be sure, we will continue to see cases about
state versus federal authority—challenges concerning the reach of the Commerce
Clause, the extent of federal preemption, and the federal government’s possible
violation of anti-commandeering principles, to name a few. And sensitivity to
“multidimensional problems involving resource allocation, governance, and
politics”2 may point the way to sounder doctrine in these cases.
If we limit our gaze to disputes about state versus federal authority,
however, we will miss many of the most important federalism tussles: fights
DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.15779/Z38N29P65H
Copyright © 2017 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their
publications.
* Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. I am grateful to the Brennan Center and NYU
Law School for hosting the Jorde Lecture program and to Heather Gerken, Ernie Young, and the
practitioners, scholars, and students who participated in the conversation. My thanks also to Henry
Monaghan, David Pozen, and the editors of the California Law Review for very helpful comments on a
draft of this commentary.
1. Heather K. Gerken, Federalism 3.0, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1696, 1703 (2017).
2. Id. at 1708.
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about the distribution of authority within the federal government. A variety of
state challenges with important consequences for twenty-first century federalism
have not concerned the roles of states and the federal government as cohesive
units. They have instead turned on questions we usually put under a distinct
separation of powers rubric: What is the scope of congressional versus federal
executive power? Has the President violated federal law, or has an administrative
agency exceeded its statutory authority? These fights, which tend to involve
some (but not all) states challenging some (but not all) federal government
actors, take federalism “all the way up.”3
In prior work, Gerken has advocated taking federalism “all the way down”
to cities and other local government units.4 The jurisdictional interdependence
and decline of sovereignty she cites should lead us to look up as well. Given the
deep integration of state and federal actors along administrative and partisan
lines, states play a role in calibrating the federal separation of powers and
shaping the execution of federal law. If federalism all the way down suggests
that states are less critical to the state side of the federalism relationship than
conventional wisdom would have it, federalism all the way up suggests that
states are more critical to the national side of the federalism relationship than
conventional wisdom would have it.
This commentary considers what federalism all the way up means for
Gerken’s proposed new process federalism. The state-federal integration she
documents underscores why judicial policing of “conditions for federal-state
bargaining”5 cannot be limited to state-federal relations in the traditional sense.
It must extend to state challenges to the allocation and exercise of authority
within the federal government. The new process federalism would therefore do
well to address when states will have standing to bring such cases in federal
court. After Part I describes contemporary federalism-all-the-way-up litigation,
Part II suggests that Gerken’s “Federalism 3.0” complicates both traditional
parens patriae and sovereignty arguments for state standing but lends force to
the recognition of states’ representative role within federal schemes.
I.
FEDERALISM UP TO THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
A foundational assumption of much federalism doctrine and scholarship is
that states will check the federal government. In recent decades, however, many
state challenges have assumed a novel form, contesting how the federal
3. The few references to “federalism all the way up” in the literature refer to a different
phenomenon: global federation. See Daniel Halberstam, Federalism: Theory, Policy, Law, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 576, 605–07 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó
eds., 2012); Ilya Somin, Foot Voting, Federalism, and Political Freedom, 55 NOMOS 83, 106–09 (2014).
4. Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 21–
33 (2010); see also, e.g., Rick Su, Intrastate Federalism, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 191 (2016) (arguing
that divisions within states are critical to understanding contemporary federalism).
5. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1704.
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executive branch carries out federal law instead of contesting federal law itself.
As some of my prior work has explored, states’ administrative and political
integration with the federal government gives them a variety of paths beyond
litigation to contest and reshape federal executive policy.6 But even as jousting
beyond the courtroom critically informs national governance, the most heated
debates often wind up in court, even if only as prelude to further negotiations.
Consider the state lawsuits filed in the early months of the Trump
Administration. When Washington, Minnesota, and Hawaii sued to enjoin the
various iterations of President Trump’s first travel ban,7 the states not only
argued that the orders were unconstitutional, but further insisted that the
President was violating several federal statutes, including the Immigration and
Nationality Act.8 Even as the states sued the federal government, they argued
that they were defending federal statutes against a President who would flout
them.9
Similar arguments arose in the federalism-all-the-way-down challenges by
cities and counties, including San Francisco and Santa Clara, to President
Trump’s executive order seeking to strip funding from “sanctuary cities.”10
While these lawsuits also included claims about commandeering and coercion,
they led with a separation of powers argument. San Francisco contended that
“[i]n directing that sanctuary jurisdictions are not eligible to receive federal
funds, the Executive Order asserts legislative power that the Constitution vests
exclusively in Congress.”11 Santa Clara similarly maintained that “[b]ecause
neither the Constitution nor an act of Congress grants the President the coercive
spending powers he now claims, the Executive Order violates the separation of
powers inherent in the Constitution.”12

6. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 VA. L. REV. 953
(2016); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112 COLUM. L.
REV. 459 (2012); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process to Administration and Politics:
The Afterlife of American Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1920 (2014).
7. Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017); Exec. Order. No. 13780, 82 Fed.
Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017); Presidential Proclamation 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017).
8. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint at 14–17, Washington v. Trump, No. 2:17-cv-00141JLR (W.D. Wash. Feb. 1, 2017), ECF No. 18; Second Amended Complaint at 34–37, Hawaii v. Trump,
No. 1:17-cv-00050-DKW-KJM (D. Haw. Mar. 8, 2017), ECF No. 64.
9. Agreeing with Hawaii, the Ninth Circuit decided the case on statutory grounds. Hawaii v.
Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 755 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[I]mmigration, even for the President, is not a one-person
show. . . . We conclude that the President, in issuing the Executive Order, exceeded the scope of the
authority delegated to him by Congress.”), judgment vacated by Trump v. Hawaii, 2017 WL 4782860
(U.S. Oct. 24, 2017). The district court subsequently adopted the Ninth Circuit’s statutory reasoning in
Hawaii’s challenge to the third iteration of the travel ban. See Hawaii v. Trump, 2017 WL 4639560 (Oct.
17, 2017). The litigation is ongoing as of this writing.
10. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
11. Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 9, San Francisco v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00485-WHO
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2017), ECF No. 21.
12. Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 12, Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00574 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 23, 2017), ECF No. 26. The district court enjoined the relevant portion of the executive order.
Order Granting the County of Santa Clara’s and City and County of San Francisco’s Motions to Enjoin
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It is not surprising that state lawyers suing President Trump would
distinguish presidential from congressional power and challenge only the former.
It is a blue-state version of high-profile, red-state challenges to President Obama.
Most notably, when Texas led a coalition of states seeking to invalidate the
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents
program (“DAPA”), the states associated themselves with Congress’s statutory
framework and contended that the federal executive branch was violating federal
law and the Take Care Clause.13 The state challenge to the Obama
Administration’s Clean Power Plan likewise did not contest the lawfulness of the
Clean Air Act but rather maintained that the EPA was exceeding its power under
that statute.14
Although state suits purporting to vindicate the federal separation of powers
or otherwise check presidential overreach have grown more prominent, and more
heated, in recent years, these suits find some precedent in prior administrations.
During the George W. Bush presidency, for instance, states challenged both the
EPA’s failure to regulate greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to congressional
authorization15 and its refusal to permit California to do so directly.16 States also

Section 9(a) of Executive Order 13768, No. 3:17-cv-00485-WHO (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2017), ECF No.
98. The litigation is ongoing as of this writing.
A group of states also moved to intervene in litigation over cost-sharing reduction payments
under the Affordable Care Act after the Trump Administration changed the government’s litigation
position. Noting that previously the “States and their residents could rely on the Executive Branch to
respond to this attack,” the states argued that they now had to defend their own interests under federal
law. Motion to Intervene of the States of California et al. at 1, 23, U.S. House of Representatives v.
Price, No. 16-5202 (D.C. Cir. May 18, 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). The states further
insisted that, in contrast to the federal executive branch (and the members of the House of
Representatives who brought the suit), they were seeking “to defend a federal statute and thereby
vindicate the Congressional will.” Id. at 23. The states are now pressing this argument in independent
litigation following President Trump’s announcement that his Administration will not make the
payments. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of a Temporary Restraining Order, California et al.
v. Trump, No. 4:17-cv-05895-KAW (N.D. Cal. Oct 18, 2017).
13. See Brief for State Respondents, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15674). The Fifth Circuit agreed with the states and upheld the district court’s nationwide preliminary
injunction, and the Supreme Court affirmed by an equally divided Court.
In the other main
immigration case of Obama’s presidency, Arizona v. United States, the state similarly attempted to
associate itself with Congress, drafting state law provisions that mirrored federal law but would be
enforced more stringently. 567 U.S. 387 (2012). Arizona argued that it was conforming to federal law
while the federal executive branch was not. See id. at 435 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (“[T]o say . . . that Arizona contradicts federal law by enforcing applications of the Immigration
Act that the President declines to enforce boggles the mind”). In litigation instigated by the federal
government, the Supreme Court held much of the state law preempted. Id. at 416.
14. See Brief of Petitioners on Core Legal Issues at 29–78, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363
(D.C. Cir. Feb. 19, 2016).
15. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
16. See California v. EPA, No. 08-1178 (D.C. Cir. filed May 5, 2008) (challenging Decision
Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156 (Mar. 6, 2008)). The petitions
were dismissed on the parties’ joint motion after the EPA reversed its decision. Decision Granting a
Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,744 (July 8, 2009).
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sued when the Attorney General attempted to prohibit doctors from prescribing
drugs for physician-assisted suicide pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act.17
States focus their challenges on the federal executive branch for a variety
of reasons. Sometimes, the exercise of federal power is unremarkable or has
previously been litigated, so an argument that assumes the constitutionality of
federal law—but not the lawfulness of the manner in which it is being
executed—is the only viable claim. In other instances, separation of powers
arguments about presidential versus congressional authority accompany more
conventional federalism arguments about the power of the federal government
as a whole vis-à-vis the states. In each case, however, the state strategically
advances its particular objection to federal policy. Consider the following
reflection by Senator Ted Cruz on his role as Texas Solicitor General in Medellín
v. Texas, a case brought by a private litigant but that ultimately pitted Texas
against the President.18 Insisting on the importance of the “meta-battle of framing
the narrative,” Cruz noted:
The other side’s narrative in Medellín was very simple and easy to
understand. ‘Can the state of Texas flout U.S. treaty obligations,
international law, the President of the United States, and the world?
And, by the way, you know how those Texans are about the death
penalty anyway!’ That’s their narrative. That’s what the case is about.
When Justice Kennedy comes home and he tells his grandson, ‘This
case is about whether a state can ignore U.S. treaty obligations,’ we lose.
So I spent a lot of time thinking about, What’s a different narrative to
explain this case?19
Cruz offered a narrative about the separation of powers. Arguing that the
President was ordering the state to act without the necessary congressional
authorization, he framed the case as a matter of presidential versus congressional
power rather than federal versus state power. He then cast Texas as Congress’s
advocate—a more compelling role than wayward state, and one most of the fifty
states have adopted in recent years.20
17. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006). Earlier state suits had similarly argued that federal
agencies were not complying with federal law. See, e.g., Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm’n v. FCC, 513
F.2d 1142, 1153 (9th Cir. 1975), overruled on other grounds by Nevada v. Burford, 918 F.2d 854 (9th
Cir. 1990) (“WUTC does not attack the constitutionality of the Communications Act on any ground;
rather, it relies upon the federal statute, and seeks to vindicate the congressional will by preventing what
it asserts to be a violation of that statute by the administrative agency charged with its enforcement.”).
18. 552 U.S. 491 (2008). Beyond its different procedural posture, Medellín is also the partisan
outlier in the examples here. It is no surprise that blue states, including California and Hawaii, are leading
the charge against the Trump Administration, nor that red Texas was at the forefront of challenges to
the Obama Administration, but Medellín pitted red Texas against a Republican (and Texan) President.
YORKER
(June
30,
2014),
19. Jeffrey
Toobin,
The
Absolutist,
NEW
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/06/30/the-absolutist-2 [https://perma.cc/UJX4-Q53U].
20. See id.; see also, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 41–42, Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S.
491
(2008)
(No.
06-984),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2007/06-984.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z8L4-D2XW] (“MR. CRUZ: Texas, of course, does not dispute that the Constitution,
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We should expect to see more state challenges to federal executive action
in the years ahead, and we should be prepared to recognize them as federalism
challenges. This is not because such cases turn on questions of state versus
federal power as traditionally conceived, or even because they neatly involve
state actors suing federal actors. Instead, as I have suggested, states purport to
defend federal legislative prerogatives against the federal executive branch.
Moreover, once intervenors and amici are figured in, such litigation almost
always involves state and federal actors on each side. Recognizing these cases
as federalism cases follows instead from accepting the reality of what we might
term “politics all the way down”—the fact that administrative and partisan
integration has largely undermined the distinctive authorities and interests of
state and federal governments.21 The best predictor of contemporary litigation
lineups is partisanship, but states and the branches of the federal government are
where partisan fights play out. In a legal landscape shaped by the “rise and rise
of the administrative state,”22 the extensive overlap of state and federal
governance domains,23 and the thorough integration of state and national
politics,24 contests about the federal separation of powers are at the same time
cases about state power.25 While states can sometimes “bargain[] over the role

laws, and treaties are the supreme law of the land. And Texas statutes must give way to any of these
three. The President’s memorandum is none of those three.”).
21. See Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty to Process, supra note 6.
22. Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231
(1994).
23. See ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN (2011); ROBERT A.
SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (2009);
Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009);
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative
Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2007).
24. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077 (2014); James
A. Gardner, The Myth of State Autonomy: Federalism, Political Parties, and the National Colonization
of State Politics, 29 J.L. & POL. 1 (2013); David Schleicher, Federalism and State Democracy, 95 TEX.
L. REV. 763 (2017).
25. Or perhaps more accurately, we might say they are ultimately contests about neither federal
nor state power. See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Foreword: Looking for Power in Public Law, 130
HARV. L. REV. 31, 40 (2016) (“The foundational power holders in American democracy are the
coalitions of policy-seeking political actors—comprising officials, voters, parties, politicians, interest
groups, and other democratic-level actors—that compete for control of these government institutions
and direct their decisionmaking. . . . [P]arsing power requires ‘passing it through’ government
institutions to the underlying democratic interests.”). In keeping with Levinson’s argument, and as the
shift above the line from states to partisan politics suggests, taking federalism all the way up pushes us
to look beyond constitutional structure. Yet both the government institutions where political
competitions are staged and the doctrines that establish rules for these competitions remain important
objects of inquiry because they frame the actions of the power-holding “coalitions of policy-seeking
actors.” Id. Moreover, focusing on structure instead of interests may aid the project of political
community in a diverse and divided polity. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 24, at 1116–35. But cf. Louis
Michael Seidman, Substitute Arguments in Constitutional Law, 31 J.L. & POL. 237 (2016) (recognizing
the potential utility of “substitute arguments”—stated reasons for a conclusion that differ from the
authentic reasons, including structural arguments motivated by partisanship—but expressing concerns
about constitutional substitution).
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they play inside the system” by invoking federalism doctrines designed “to
preserve . . . the role they play outside of it,”26 they often have to fight from
within, choosing federal allies and parsing the federal government accordingly.
II.
STATE STANDING WITHIN FEDERAL LAW
If federalism cases frequently turn on the lawfulness of federal executive
action, one question for the “new process federalism” is whether such cases can
get into court in the first place—in particular, whether states can satisfy the
Article III standing requirements to bring their claims in federal court.27 A
decade after the Supreme Court recognized “special solicitude” for
Massachusetts’s standing claim in the state’s suit against the EPA,28 the meaning
and durability of such solicitude remain unsettled, especially following the
Court’s 4-4 split in United States v. Texas.29 Even the basic question of what
warrants special solicitude remains unclear: “proprietary” interests, “sovereign”
interests, and “quasi-sovereign” interests have traditionally been distinct bases
for standing,30 but Massachusetts invoked an injury to state property, the cession
of state sovereign governance prerogatives to the federal government, and a
parens patriae interest in citizen health and welfare.31 Recent state suits would
similarly amalgamate financial injuries, injuries to state sovereignty, and injuries
to state residents’ welfare.32
Although legal scholarship has offered a variety of thoughtful and
innovative arguments about state standing post-Massachusetts, what Gerken
calls “Federalism 1.0”33 continues to inform doctrine and commentary. The
nationalist variant of Federalism 1.0 is captured by the Massachusetts v. Mellon
rule that a “state does not have standing as parens patriae to bring an action
26. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1704; see, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of
Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96
MICH. L. REV. 813 (1998) (arguing that the anti-commandeering rule facilitates state-federal bargaining
in cooperative federalism programs).
27. Even a state deemed to have standing may face other obstacles, such as establishing a right
of action. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 (2014)
(“Whether a plaintiff comes within ‘the ‘zone of interests’ is an issue that requires us to determine, using
traditional tools of statutory interpretation, whether a legislatively conferred cause of action
encompasses a particular plaintiff’s claim.”); see also, e.g., Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami,
137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017) (holding that the City of Miami is an “aggrieved person” authorized to sue under
the Fair Housing Act).
28. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007).
29. 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.).
30. See, e.g., Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600–02
(1982).
31. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518–21.
32. See, e.g., Brief for State Respondents, supra note 13, at 18–31 (discussing the state’s
financial injuries, sovereignty injuries, and parens patriae injuries); First Amended Complaint, supra
note 8, at 2 (“The States bring this action to redress harms to their proprietary interests and their interests
as parens patriae . . . .”).
33. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1698.
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against the Federal Government.”34 Rejecting the state’s constitutional challenge
to a federal law, the Court wrote: “While the State, under some circumstances,
may sue [as parens patriae] for the protection of its citizens, it is no part of its
duty or power to enforce their rights in respect of their relations with the Federal
Government. In that field it is the United States, and not the State, which
represents them as parens patriae, when such representation becomes
appropriate; and to the former, and not to the latter, they must look for such
protective measures as flow from that status.”35 Defending the Mellon rule in the
context of subsequent state challenges to the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
Alexander Bickel argued that the states “are not to contest, as if between one
sovereign and another in some quasi-international forum, the actions of the
national institutions. For the national government is fully in privity with the
people it governs, and needs, and should brook, no intermediaries.”36 According
to such doctrine and commentary, it is misguided or even incoherent to regard
states as protectors of the nation’s people when considering federal law.
Against this limitation on parens patriae standing, some scholars have
turned their attention from the state’s representative capacity to its governance
prerogatives. Articulating a federalist variant of Federalism 1.0, they argue for
state standing to sue the federal government to vindicate sovereign state interests.
For instance, Stephen Vladeck suggests that “although states may not generally
challenge the constitutionality of federal regulation on behalf of their citizens,
there are a handful of constitutional provisions under which the federal
government operates on the states qua states, and not merely as a proxy for their
citizens.”37 In particular, he defends state standing to press Tenth Amendment
claims, such as an anti-commandeering argument or an anti-coercion
argument.38 Bringing a federalist approach to bear on claims against the federal
executive branch in particular, Tara Leigh Grove argues that states should not
have special standing to ensure the federal executive’s proper implementation of
federal law; rather, standing should be premised on the protection of state law.39

34. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 610 n.16 (1982) (citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447, 485–86 (1923); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901)).
35. Mellon, 262 U.S. at 485–86.
36. Alexander M. Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 79, 89 (1966). For a
broader argument against state standing to sue the federal government, see Ann Woolhandler & Michael
G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387 (1995).
37. Stephen I. Vladeck, States’ Rights and State Standing, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 845, 848 (2012).
38. Id. at 862–63; see also Katherine Mims Crocker, Note, Securing Sovereign State Standing,
97 VA. L. REV. 2051 (2011) (arguing for state standing to vindicate sovereign interests).
39. Tara Leigh Grove, When Can a State Sue the United States, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 855
(2016) (“States have broad standing to protect federalism principles, not the constitutional separation of
powers.”). Focusing on the preemption of state sovereign power as a critical variable, a few
commentators have argued for state standing to challenge the federal executive branch when federal law
has displaced state regulatory authority yet the federal executive branch underenforces that law and
leaves regulatory gaps. See Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE
L.J. 2023, 2037–39 (2008); Jonathan R. Nash, Sovereign Preemption State Standing (Emory Univ. Law
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As some cases and scholarship recognize, state lawsuits that parse the
federal government challenge both the parens patriae-focused nationalist
account and the sovereignty-focused federalist account of state standing. If we
take seriously state allegations that the federal executive branch is violating
federal law, the federal government no longer appears as a single unit
representing the people, as Mellon posits. Instead, disaggregated into (at least)
its legislative and executive branches, the federal government becomes at once
the target and the ally of the state challenger: the state contests federal executive
decisions but purports to defend Congress in doing so. Recognizing the
multiplicity of the federal government in these challenges, some courts have
ruled that “a suit to ‘vindicate the Congressional will’ by preventing an
administrative agency from violating a federal statute, unlike a challenge to the
constitutionality of the underlying statute, does not implicate the federalism
concerns behind the Mellon decision.”40 Massachusetts v. EPA noted the “critical
difference between allowing a State ‘to protect her citizens from the operation of
federal statutes’ (which is what Mellon prohibits) and allowing a State to assert
its rights under federal law (which it has standing to do).”41
If disaggregating the federal government complicates a nationalist bar on
state standing grounded in Mellon’s parens patriae logic, so too does statefederal administrative integration diminish the federalists’ sovereignty basis for
state standing. As Gerken reminds us, “[T]here’s not much [room for state
sovereignty] left anymore.”42 The Court’s purported reliance on state
sovereignty in Massachusetts, for example, was in fact a reliance on its absence.
Noting that the state had “surrender[ed] certain sovereign prerogatives” to the
federal government, the Court reasoned that the lodging of these sovereign
prerogatives in the federal government gave the state a cognizable interest in
ensuring the EPA’s compliance with federal law.43 Massachusetts’s “sovereign”

Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series Paper No. 17-427, Jan. 26, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2906614 [https://perma.cc/8PP7-TB8U].
40. Abrams v. Heckler, 582 F. Supp. 1155, 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also, e.g., Kansas ex. rel. Hayden v. United States, 748 F. Supp. 797, 802 (D. Kan. 1990)
(“[U]nlike the plaintiffs in Mellon, the plaintiff in this case is not challenging the validity of the federal
statutes. Instead, plaintiff is seeking to enforce the provisions of the [federal statute].”); cf. Maryland
People’s Counsel v. FERC, 760 F.2d 318, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“The prerogative of the federal
government to represent the interests of its citizens . . . is not endangered so long as Congress has the
power of conferring or withholding standing.”).
41. 549 U.S. 497, 520 n.17 (2007); see also, e.g., Calvin R. Massey, State Standing After
Massachusetts v. EPA, 61 FLA. L. REV. 249, 268 (2009) (defending the Court’s recognition “that states
may act for their residents by asserting the quasi-sovereign interest of preserving the well-being of their
residents with respect to benefits to which they may be entitled under federal law”).
42. See Gerken, supra note 1, at 1701.
43. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519–20; cf. Shannon M. Roesler, State Standing to Challenge
Federal Authority in the Modern Administrative State, 91 WASH. L. REV. 637, 677 (2016) (“When states
challenge federal actions (or inaction) under [cooperative federalism] schemes, they are playing the role
of a sovereign state in a post-sovereignty world.”).
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interest turned out to be ensuring federal legislative supremacy, not protecting
its own autonomy.
Gerken’s Federalism 3.0 suggests that the states’ most important role going
forward will be to bring challenges from within federal schemes instead of
insisting on governing separate and apart. In standing parlance, the oxymoronic
“quasi-sovereign” label best captures this role. On most conceptions of
sovereignty, there should be no such thing as “quasi-sovereignty.” But insofar as
it recognizes states’ persistent representative capacity rather than their
diminished autonomous governance capacity, the “quasi-sovereign” label
reflects states’ ability to stand for their people’s interests vis-à-vis federal
actors—even when these interests are not particular to the people of that state,
and even when they derive from or otherwise fall within federal law.44 It rejects
both an insistence on federal-state separation and a Bickelian confidence that
“the national government is fully in privity with the people it governs.”45
Further elaborating the basis for state standing to challenge federal
executive action would be a productive task for the “new process federalism.”
Some might reply that a “new” process federalism is unnecessary. Ernest Young
and other critics of administrative federalism have suggested that the good old
process federalism provides a solid footing. If we accept the premise that states
are represented by the House and especially Senate but not by the federal
executive branch,46 states might well forfeit their right to challenge federal law
in court rather than in the halls of Congress,47 but they should retain the ability
to challenge executive compliance with federal law.48 I am less confident in this
premise. Given the power of partisanship—a partisanship that is national in
scope and that largely eclipses state interests in Congress (as elsewhere)—the
old process federalism takes congressional representation of states too seriously
while neglecting other channels for state influence.49 It may also too readily
44. Cf. ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2010)
(considering how a new federal ideology allowed American founders to divide authority between the
federal government and the states without running afoul of the prohibition on imperium in imperio).
45. Bickel, supra note 36, at 89.
46. See Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 869, 869 (2008) (“As the
constitutional limits on national action fade into history, the primary remaining safeguards for state
autonomy are political, stemming from the representation of the states in Congress, and procedural,
arising from the sheer difficulty of navigating the federal legislative process. These safeguards have little
purchase on executive action.”); see also Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 908 (2000)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Unlike Congress, administrative agencies are clearly not designed to represent
the interests of States.”).
47. See Bickel, supra note 36, at 89.
48. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Federal Courts Scholars and Southeastern Legal Foundation
in Support of Respondents at 30–31, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-674)
(“Because Congress’s role supplies the bulwark protection for state interests, the circumvention of the
legislative process that Respondent States allege here works a unique injury to their interests. And the
United States cannot be heard to argue that this dispute . . . should be deferred to political resolution
when the national Executive has made an end-run around that very political process in which
Respondent States would otherwise have been represented.”).
49. See Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism, supra note 6.
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credit state arguments that vindicating congressional will is a straightforward
task for the judiciary.50
Understanding judicial review as the beginning, not the end, of matters
partially addresses these concerns. If we want to preserve “the correct conditions
for federal-state bargaining over the role [states] play inside the system,” as
Gerken advocates,51 we should first note that such state-federal bargaining will
generally involve the federal executive branch. Standing doctrine focused on
state challenges to the executive branch makes good sense, then, not because
Congress represents state interests, but rather because the President or federal
agency officials must come to the table. Indeed, although engaging the federal
executive has not motivated the doctrine to date, past cases recognizing state
standing to challenge federal executive action have nonetheless shifted debate to
the administrative realm. After Massachusetts prevailed in its suit against the
EPA, for example, the Obama Administration granted California its previously
denied waiver, reached an agreement with state officials and automakers on
federal fuel efficiency standards, and crafted a federal rule that built on and
extended existing state projects, such as the northeastern Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative.52
Because there is no guarantee that courts will stimulate productive
intergovernmental negotiation, ascertaining the conditions under which they are
most likely to do so is an important project for any new process federalism.53
Disaggregating the federal government is part of this work, though only a start.
Insofar as it ultimately privileges politics over litigation, this project might also
respond to a distinct separation of powers concern about liberalized standing: the
aggrandizement of the federal judiciary.54 If litigation between states and the
federal executive branch precedes or temporarily interrupts administrative
negotiation, courts need not arrogate to themselves the “[v]indicat[ion of] the
50. See id. at 1016–23; see also Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems,
163 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2014) (noting complications of statutory obsolescence and congressional
dysfunction in evaluating administrative responses to new problems).
51. See Gerken, supra note 1, at 1704.
52. See Decision Granting a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,744 (July 8,
2009); Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy
Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010); Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (Clean Power
Plan). Some of these actions were then the subject of new state litigation. See, e.g., supra note 16 and
accompanying text. As the Trump Administration seeks to undo the environmental commitments of the
Obama Administration, states are pushing to retain and improve existing standards through both
administrative action and litigation. See, e.g., Reid Wilson, Blue States Rush to Block Trump’s
Emission’s Rollback, THE HILL (Mar. 15, 2017), http://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/324179blue-states-rush-to-block-trumps-emissions-rollback [https://perma.cc/T4LC-B3Q2]; We Are Still In,
http://wearestillin.com [https://perma.cc/ZV4R-HYUF].
53. See Gerken, supra note 1, at 1704–05.
54. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (arguing that standing “is built on a
single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers”). But see Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing,
61 STAN. L. REV. 459 (2008) (arguing that standing doctrine does not actually serve its purported
separation of powers functions).
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public interest”55 when entertaining such challenges. Federalism all the way up
reminds us, however, that vindicating the public interest is a function usefully
assigned not only to “the Congress and the Chief Executive,” but to the states as
well.56

55.
56.

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992).
Id.

